Tom Coyner, president of business development firmSoft Landing Korea, and author of the Korea Economic Reader, writes in The Korean Joong Ang Daily about a Korean social problem that doesn’t sound all that foreign:
Getting to the crux of corruption
by Tom Coyner
Korea JoongAng Daily
Whenever I read a news item regarding Korean corruption, I have mixed feelings. Usually, the article is based on the latest finding by a well-meaning NGO that focuses on the corrupting influence of big business on government without adequately addressing the root causes or even the breadth of corruption. Korean corruption doesn’t limit itself to envelopes and car trunks of cash being paid by business people to government officers.
So one may ask oneself, “Can Korea end its many forms of corruption?” That is the essential question, and the obvious answer is “no.”
I don’t mean that as a cynical observation. Rather as much as I recognize Korean corruption having greatly decreased from its much higher levels of 30 years ago, the nature of Korean society precludes corruption from being significantly reduced from present levels.
When I was a Peace Corps volunteer in the Korean countryside in the 1970s, virtually everyone lived in poverty by U.S. standards. Some lived in squalor, but the overwhelming majority lived simply and frugally. Those who were considered well-off at that time and place would nonetheless have been considered to be poor by American standards. However, the relatively well off often had an attitude that could be haughty given that their well-being was measured in the context of their villages and towns.
At the other end of the scale, Korean public servants were paid ridiculously low wages, as is the case in many developing countries. They actually needed outside income to live relatively comfortably and send their children to schools and universities. Often, the only plausible means for this large societal segment was to receive “gratuities.” One could normally count on having to pretty consistently pay 10 percent to get various matters handled. Eventually, the Korean government realized that low public sector wages were a poor value.
Today, Korean public sector workers overall get decent wages, steady employment and superior retirement benefits – so much so that the competition to get these jobs often even by over-qualified applicants is quite severe.
In any case, wealth, which many people may assume to be the end goal of corruption, is only relative. Rather, social power, as defined within one’s social context, is the real corrupting influence. And the corruption is not limited to government officials and business tycoons. NGO executives, particularly when the left wing is in power, find themselves in privileged positions and, unsurprisingly, as we witnessed under Presidents Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-hyun, there was a 10-year spike in corruption involving NGOs.
If corruption were measured by money or goods, then we might consider a limit on luxury handbags and gold watches. But the fact is, on the other extreme, if someone has 10 gold watches and two dozen luxury handbags, there will be a quest for even more. One can say the motivation is greed, but it’s obviously not greed for even more handbags and watches. More likely, these well-off individuals are driven by envy of anyone else possessing the same or a greater number of goods newer or higher quality or status.
The fundamental problem is that being a member of Korean society is very much a status-conscious undertaking, partially based on insecurity as to whether any individual or family truly deserves its presumptive ranking.
What is less controversial is whether a Korean is in possession of enviable goods or amounts of money. And to make matters even more competitive, success, achievement and social ranking are more narrowly defined in Korea than in many advanced societies.
Consequently, once an individual or family feels secure that they are not in danger of being left behind, they immediately recalibrate their insecurity so as to try to catch up to, if not lead, other people in the next higher levels of society.
Ergo, my conclusion is this: Some improvements in reducing corruption will likely be made by new legislation, regulations, enforcement, or the likes. But until Koreans essentially ease up on themselves and learn to be happier with who they are and what they possess, envy and insecurity will drive otherwise intelligent individuals to participating in foolhardy acts, including corruption.
So can corruption be effectively reduced in large measure from present levels? Perhaps. Will we see substantial reductions? I’m doubtful.
On the other hand, Koreans have surprised both the world and themselves many times over. At the same time, the causes of corruption rest on the bedrock of Korean cultural and group psychology fundamentals. At best, I can only hope matters may improve over time. And who knows? They just may.